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Abstract:  
The result of the referendum in the United Kingdom in 2016 to leave the European Union 
sparked much interest on the socio-economic characteristics of ‘Brexiters’. In this article we 
challenge the popularised view of the Leave voter as an outsider and find that individuals 
from an intermediate class, whose malaise is due to a declining financial position, represent 
an important segment of the Brexit vote. We use individual-level data from a post-Brexit 
survey based on the British Election Study. Our analysis tests three predictive models. First, 
although our analysis confirms the negative association between education and Leave vote, 
we find that voting Leave is associated more with intermediate levels of education than with 
low or absent education, in particular in the presence of a perceived declining economic 
position. Secondly, we find that Brexiters hold distinct psycho-social features of malaise due 
to declining economic conditions, rather than anxiety or anger. Thirdly, our exploratory 
model finds voting Leave associated with self-identification as middle class, rather than with 
working class. We also find that intermediate levels of income were not more likely to vote 
for remain than low income groups. Overall our analysis of the Brexit vote underlines the 
importance of considering the political behaviour of the declining middle. 
Keywords: Brexit, squeezed middle, globalization, left behind, inequality 
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Introduction 
In June 2016, the United Kingdom voted, with a marginal majority of 51.89 per cent, 
to withdraw its membership (‘Brexit’) of the European Union. Analyses of the vote 
in respect to the rising level of inequality and the socio-economic conditions of 
Leavers have followed. In this article we contribute to the existing literature on the 
socio-economic causes of the Brexit vote by investigating individual-level 
explanations through a post-Brexit panel run in June/July 2016. Offering a new 
perspective on the topic, we argue that Brexit is best explained as the social malaise 
of intermediate classes, which have experienced a declining financial position in the 
last years - the so called ‘squeezed middle’.  
Public debates and first academic contributions have converged, at least initially, on 
the interpretation of the Brexit vote as a vote of the ‘left behind’, of the ‘outsiders’ 
and, overall, of ‘globalisation losers’ (Hobolt, 2016a; Goodwin and Heath, 2016b). 
Some public commentators have interpreted Brexit as the voice of the angry working 
class—a view which has gained much public coverage (Mckenzie 2016). Previous 
studies have found that while the Leave vote reflects the lack of opportunities across 
the country, the profile of the Leave voters is not homogenous, both with respect to 
education (Goodwin and Heath, 2016a) and to socio-economic conditions (Swales 
2016a). The Leave vote appears to be less socially uniform than popular coverage 
would concede, but the socio-economic and psycho-social factors that made voting 
Leave appealing for a significant segment of the British population are yet to be 
explained. Previous contributions have referred indirectly or directly (see Colantone 
and Stanig, 2016) to Brexit as the effect of a social/economic malaise. This broad 
concept refers to the idea that the vote was driven both by negative socio-economic 
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and psycho-social conditions – two elements that we explore in this article. Our 
article fills the existing gap by proposing an alternative narrative of the Brexit voter 
that overcomes the dichotomous vocabulary in the literature (globalisation winners 
versus losers, economically affluent versus deprived voters). We present three core 
findings that elaborate the relationship between voting Leave and the socio-
economic and psycho-social characteristics of the declining middle.  
Our first hypothesis is that the probability of voting Leave is high, not only among 
those with low levels of education, but also those with intermediate levels of 
education, in particular this interacts with negative dynamics in personal finance. In 
our second model, we selected feelings that permit an exploration of Leavers’ social 
malaise and exclusion in psycho-social terms (in particular anxiety, anger whether 
life had got complicated, whether respondent feels left out of society, and whether 
what respondent does in society has any worth). We hypothesize that anxiety about 
one’s life could be a potential contributing factor to the decision to vote Leave, in 
particular in the context of a declining financial situation. We further test whether 
experiencing feelings of anger influences Leavers, which allows for an examination 
of particular emotions. In our third exploratory model we explore vote Leave in 
relation to class identification. We hypothesise that self-identification with the 
working class was not a driver of the Leave vote. Rather we expect higher 
proportions of Leavers among those identifying themselves as middle class or even 
identifying with no class at all. 
We have structured the article in the following way. After examining the main issues 
covered in the political sociology of Brexit, we present our theoretical framework to 
explore Brexit. We then discuss the methodology, covering the data, sampling and 
analysis of the three different models. The fourth section discusses the findings of 
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the three models: the relationship between education and declining economic 
position; psycho-social factors; income and social class self-identification. Our 
findings in respect to these three areas challenge the profile of the Brexit voter as 
socio-economically left out or angry ‘globalisation loser’ (Hobolt 2016a). We find 
that Brexiters are voters in intermediate positions which have declined in economic 
terms and experience a general feeling of social malaise. In the conclusion we 
discuss some of the implications of our findings for the Brexit debate and for future 
studies in political economy, political sociology and social policy. 
  
The political sociology of Brexit: debates and issues 
The aftermath of the UK’s referendum on EU membership has sparked several 
debates regarding the socio-political causes of the referendum’s outcome and the 
wider sociological implications of Brexit. The first set of explanations concerns the 
idea that the outcome of the vote reflects wider socio-economic dynamics, although 
there is no agreement on the specific socio-economic drivers of Brexit. Davies 
(2016) explains the political support for Brexit in the North East as a long-term 
effect of the economic crisis experienced in the region since the 1970s. According to 
this reading, Leave voters represent socio-economic groups that have been affected 
by processes of post-industrialisation. For Dorling (2016) the political frustration 
expressed via Brexit reflects the social costs of austerity and cuts in public spending 
post-2008. The first empirical analyses seem to confirm this reading. Voting Leave is 
associated with individual characteristics of voters (education, age and status), area 
characteristics (manufacturing employment, low income and high unemployment), 
and, crucially, also local spending cuts (Becker et al 2016). 
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These socio-economic processes behind the Brexit vote do not simply reflect the 
UK’s political economy, but can be interpreted as the effect of the wider political 
phenomenon of a rejection of globalisation by those who have been most affected by 
it (Hobolt 2016a). This interpretation would be in line with long-standing theory 
arguing that globalisation, in particular in the shape of free trade, would penalise 
some segments of the population defined as the ‘globalisation losers’ (Hays et al, 
2005: Rodrik, 1998). The evidence showing that Leave voters were more present in 
regions hit harder by import shocks from China (Colantone and Stanig 2016) seems 
to support this idea. 
Further elaborating this argument, a number of authors have supported the widely 
popularised view of the Leave vote as an expression of society’s ‘left behind’ 
(Hobolt, 2016a: Goodwin and Heath, 2016b). Hobolt (2016a) argued that Leave and 
Remain voters reflect two sharply divided social profiles: leave voters that represent 
globalisation losers lacking education and employment opportunities, while Remain 
voters are globalisation winners and reflect the profile of the educated urban voter. 
Similarly, Goodwin and Heath argue that “the vote for Brexit was delivered by the 
‘left behind’ – social groups that are united by a general sense of insecurity, 
pessimism and marginalization” (2016b).  
Kaufman (2016) has rejected socio-economic explanations of Brexit and has argued 
that the vote is mostly explained by the authoritarian values held by Leave voters. 
His analysis is, however, limited by the fact that the connection between Leavers’ 
education and their socio-economic conditions are unexplored in his model. At the 
same time, even studies showing that a portion of Leave voters have been 
economically disadvantaged, concede that the success of the Leave vote “was 
underpinned by a broad-based coalition of voters which is much more wide-ranging 
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than the ‘left behind’” (Swales 2016a: 2). This does not mean that socio-economic 
explanations of Brexit have to be excluded, but simply that those explanations have 
to account for socio-economic changes affecting more wider segments of the 
population. Although several scholars have used education to operationalize the ‘left 
behind’ argument (Hobolt 2016a, Goodwin and Heath 2016a), a missing element in 
the puzzle is how education is linked to socio-economic conditions. 
Some sociologists have suggested that the Brexit vote reflects a shift by the working 
class towards right-wing politics, which is the result of the lack of a left-wing option 
(Winlow et al, 2017: Mckenzie 2016). The lack of left-wing political support amongt 
the working class, however, is not an unknown phenomenon in political science 
scholarship and has characterised politics for a several decades (Inglehart, 1997; 
Evans 1999; Houtman, 2003). Using the helpful distinction by Houtman et al (2009), 
while we know that Brexit reflects cultural voting (voting for an authoritarian 
agenda), we lack evidence that it represents class voting (defined as voting on the 
grounds of economically egalitarian political values generated by a weak class 
position).   
The image of the Leave voter as left behind is not only related to personal finance 
and class, but also to specific psycho-social conditions, such as the anger of the 
globalisation losers. Previous studies on Brexit have left untapped the distinct 
psycho-social characteristics of Leavers and how this relates to their socio-economic 
conditions. The culture of risk and of manufactured uncertainty described by risk 
scholars such as Beck (2009) has permeated the referendum campaign, both from the 
Leave and the Remain side (Burgess 2016). It has also resulted in a confusion 
between objective and imaginary risks. For example migration has been a core 
motivation behind the vote (Ashcroft 2016) despite its lack of objective impact on 
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the lives of Leavers (Becker et al 2016). Anger and fear expressed by the Leave 
voters could therefore be the reaction to uncertainty that reflects the passage to a 
globalised society where risk is more prevalent  (Beck 1992, Giddens 1991). As well 
as understanding Leavers’ individual socio-economic context it is, therefore, crucial 
to interpret their psycho-social profile and to clarify how this might be related to 
their personal economic conditions. In our study we specifically address the issue of 
globalisation in relation to social risks. In the next paragraph we describe our 
framework to contribute to these unanswered issues. 
The conceptual framework 
The terminology of the ‘left behind’ (see Hobolt, 2016a; Goodwin and Heath 2016b) 
suggests that Brexit has been the voice of a small and marginalised segment of the 
population, but authors have suggested that the Brexit vote represents a more  
general malaise amongst the ‘ordinary’ British people (Hobolt 2016b). The Leave 
vote is not uniformly represented by one social group and is much more widespread 
among the population than the left behind argument would suggest.  
We discuss the social malaise expressed through the Brexit vote by including a 
missing category in the analysis of the vote: the intermediate class. In doing this we 
are implicitly rejecting the dichotomous class division ‘middle’ versus ‘working 
class’. The recent literature in contemporary social policy shows that the economic 
vulnerability of the intermediate class has increased in the last years. This 
intermediate group has been defined as the ‘squeezed middle’, a term originally 
coined in the United States, which has been also applied to describe the situation of 
British ordinary workers coping with the increasing cost of living and inflation 
(Parker, 2013). The squeezed middle constitutes an intermediate social position that 
is slowly declining these are ‘ordinary’ families with intermediate/upper-
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intermediate levels of education, stable jobs, but which face an increasing challenge 
in maintaining their life-style (ibid.). This group is experiencing a decline in 
economic circumstances due to the widening inequalities between classes which 
rewards those at the top (Hills, 2014) and the declining capacity of contemporary 
welfare states to protect the ‘middle’ against social risks (Hacker, 2008 and 2011). It 
is not, therefore, a group that can be defined as ‘left out’, ‘outsider’ or responds to 
the description of the low skilled globalisation loser in classical terms. It is rather a 
group in the middle which has been affected by the increasing social vulnerability in 
the society (Vaughan-Whitehead, 2016; Ranci, 2010). 
Our models broadly explore the links between voters’ financial position, in absolute 
as well as dynamic terms, and the referendum vote, in relation to three groups of key 
individual characteristics; education, psycho-social conditions, and social class 
identification. Ultimately, we hypothesise intermediate classes to be more likely to 
vote Leave. We present and test our hypotheses using the following three groups of 
models, which allow to operationalize the theory of the squeezed middle as the core 
segment of the population to drive the Leave vote: 
The educational and declining economic position of ‘leavers’ The left-behind 
argument has been pointed to in terms of voters having low levels of education (and 
therefore low skills) to compete in the globalised economy, as opposed to those with 
a university degree (see Hobolt, 2016a; Goodwin and Heath, 2016a). We 
problematize this notion of the left behind. In early descriptive studies, educational 
differences found among Remainers and Leavers could simply reflect the fact that 
the younger generation, which were more likely to vote for Remain, are also better 
educated. Moreover, the higher percentage of people with lower educational 
attainments among Leavers could reflect the fact that people with low education hold 
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more authoritarian values, which according to Kaufman (2016) are the ultimate 
drivers of the vote. Analyses exploring the relationship between the propensity to 
vote Leave and education in relation to other socioeconomic variables have found a 
more nuanced picture of the Leave voter than extends beyond their lack of education. 
For example, Goodwin and Heath (2016a) have explored the relationship between 
education and regional opportunities, finding that Leave vote is explained by an 
interaction effect between individual level of education and the profile of the area 
where they live. Their analysis shows that in ‘low skilled communities’ even 
graduates were more likely to vote for Brexit than graduates from high skilled 
communities and had similar profiles to those with low education from the same 
communities. In our first model, we explore why the probability of voting Leave is 
high only among those with low levels of education or whether it includes those with 
intermediate levels of education. Further, we try to understand how the probability of 
voting for Leave among different educational groups changes in respect to dynamics 
of personal finance.   
Leavers and the psycho-social effects of globalisation 
Some authors have hinted at Leavers displaying distinct psycho-social feelings of 
malaise regarding globalisation (Goodwin and Heath, 2016b; Hobolt,2016a). It has 
not yet been clarified, however, whether this reflects objective change in standards of 
living or a generalised attitude towards the new risks associated with globalisation. 
The idea that globalisation is associated with emotional sentiments is not new in the 
literature and Brexit can be interpreted as another case of the ‘political economy of 
uncertainty’ described by Beck (1999). Among Leavers we can recognize, for 
example, the risk of losing one’s individual position as a consequence of higher 
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migration flows linked to EU membership – a risk that the vote in itself offered to 
resolve. Authors have previously found negative feelings associated with the 
management of risk stemming from globalisation. Beck’s notion of 
‘individualisation’ is described as “a default outcome of a failure of expert systems 
to manage risks.” (Beck, 2006: 336). Globalisation generates negative feelings: 
individuals are described to be resentful (Brown, 1993) and fearful (Pain, 2009). 
Some of these feelings are related to issues at the core of the Brexit debate, such as 
migration. The study by Clarke (2009), for example, describes how the possibility of 
migration per se poses a symbolic threat to the “emotional construction of the white 
identity” built around the imaginary golden age of English white communities. 
In our framework, we begin by exploring the effect of basic emotions, untested in the 
Brexit debate, to build the foundation for discussing more specific psycho-social 
feelings, such as life satisfaction, and standing in society. While anxiety has been 
linked to voting behaviour in terms of increased information search and a propensity 
for opinion change (e.g. Marcus et al 2000), anxiety effects are untheorised in 
relation to declining finances and/or supporting an anti-elitist agenda, and only 
anecdotal evidence linked it to the Brexit vote. We thus hypothesize that anxiety 
over one’s life could be a potential contributing factor to the decision to vote Leave, 
in particular in the context of a declining financial situation. Further, we test whether 
a distinct anger effect describes Leavers, who are, much more likely to challenge the 
status quo as ‘blame’ is not uncertain (as in anxiety), but aimed at  the specific actor 
(namely the European Institutions, see Wagner 2014).  
We then proceed to explore the crucial issue of psycho-social features, in particular 
in relation to personal economic conditions. Our psycho-social wellbeing indicators 
concern quality of life, and we explicitly test whether the feeling of being left 
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behind, feeling life has got complicated, and negative feelings over doing something 
worthwhile in life characterise Leavers as a group. We conclude our discussion by 
exploring whether the feeling of being left behind is related to a deteriorating 
financial position, which would affect, not only the working class, also the ‘squeezed 
middle’  
Leavers, social class self-identification and income. Immediately after the UK’s 
referendum vote on the member of the EU, a popular view, albeit lacking empirical 
ground, was that of the Brexit vote as a voice of the working-class, in particular in 
the North of England (Mckenzie, 2016). The first evidence from Lord Ashcroft’s 
survey presented by Dorling (2016) showed that most Leave voters were in the 
South and that 59 per cent of all those who voted for Leave were in the middle 
classes (A, B or C1), with the lowest two social classes (D and E) representing only 
24 per cent of the Leave vote. Similarly, Swales’ analysis (2016a) indicates that, in 
addition to attracting groups with limited economic resources, Brexit has also 
mobilised voters that  belong to the ‘middle class’. 
The Brexit vote raises interesting questions regarding the reconfiguration of the class 
structure. Recent studies on self-perception of class in the UK show that most people 
perceive themselves as ‘working class’ even if they hold ‘middle class jobs’ (Swales, 
2016b) and, therefore, they rather belong to what we define as the squeezed middle. 
The dichotomous nature of the class debate in the UK creates confusion in 
interpreting the class politics behind Brexit. For example, sociologists who interpret 
Brexit as working class vote assume that this class vote carries egalitarian claims 
(see Winlow et al, 2017; Mckenzie, 2016). Empirical studies have found that the 
vote of Leavers with limited socio-economic resources was associated to 
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authoritarian (Ashcroft 2016) and anti-immigrant sentiments associated with the vote 
of economically deprived Leavers (see Swales 2016a).  
Through our final exploratory model we will attempt to overcome the current 
limitations of Brexit’s analyses in relation to class by investigating the self-
identification of class of Leave voters and we also analyse this in relation to 
objective measures of inequality. We hypothesise that the self-identification as 
working class was not a driver of the Leave vote, rather we expect a higher 
proportion of Leavers among those identifying themselves as middle class or those 
that have no class identification.  
Methodology 
To investigate our hypotheses and explore measurement options to describe the 
‘squeezed middle’, we rely on three data sources: our online opt-in panel 
implemented shortly after the referendum that ran from 28 June until 10 July 2016, 
the British Election Study Internet Panel referendum campaign wave (Evans et al 
2016) and our own referendum campaign study running through June 2016. 
Our sample respondents are recruited from the pool of users of our UK Voting 
Advice Applications (VAAs), available on the web in 2015 (during the General 
Elections campaign) and 2016 (during the Brexit campaign). VAAs are relatively 
new online information tools attracting potentially millions of users designed to 
make party and candidate positions more accessible by comparing users and parties 
on an interactive landscape (see Garzia and Marshall, 2012). 
While interacting with these tools, VAA users have the option to sign up for follow-
up surveys, which is how we accessed data for our pre- and post- referendum studies. 
Although we did obtain a reasonably large and diverse sample in the post-
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referendum wave (N = 2,809), we acknowledge self-selection bias on a host of 
indicators. VAA users and opt-in respondents tend to be more urban, male, 
politically interested individuals with higher education (Pianzola and Ladner, 2011).  
Thus we benchmark our sample to the British Election Study, and compute post-
stratification weights to each respondent in our panel.  This enables us to use a non-
representative sample to make reasonable population-level inference (Popp et al 
(2016) provides a more detailed review). 1  The next section describes our key 
measures of model building and hypothesis testing. 
Models 
We fit five mixed-effects logistic regressions with probability to vote Leave as the 
dependent variable and a host of individual-level variables exploring education (also 
in relation to personal economic conditions), psycho-social wellbeing and class. We 
also control for age, gender, and political support. 
Leavers’ education & lowering economic position. As we have seen in the first part, 
the class differences behind Brexit have often been discussed in relation to the level 
of education achieved by voters (Hobolt 2016a, Goodwin and Heath 2016a). Our 
intent, in Model 1.1 (Figure 1) is to explore the probability of vote in relation to 
education to test the view of the Leave voter as the globalisation loser, with lower 
levels of education and skills. The education variable has ordered categories of levels 
‘no education’, ‘GSCE D-G’, ‘GSCE A*-C’, ‘A-level’, ‘Undergraduate’, 
‘Postgraduate’2 . This follows the variable coding convention used in the British 
                                                 
1 The full discussion of the methodology (e.g. modeling, weights and stratification) is 
available as an online appendix at www.voteadvice.org/squeezed-online.html 
2  GSCE refers to the General Certificate of Secondary Education, the UK 
qualification of secondary education. The GSCE leads to two types of qualifications 
depending on the grade: Level 1 qualification for GCSE at grades D to G and Level 
2 qualification for GSCE at grades A* to C. A-level refers to the General Certificate 
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Election Studies. A clear advantage is that intermediate levels of education, namely 
those between 'no education' and higher education, could be differentiated enough, 
especially with a split between low (and mandatory) grades of GCSEs and higher 
grades of GCSEs 
In Model 1.2 (Figure 1) we take a step further by looking at the relationship between 
Leave vote and education in relation to the dynamic aspect of personal finances. We 
are interested in how a perceived change in personal finances in the past five years 
might moderate the education effects and thus define an interaction between them. 
Our analysis is limited by the fact that we analysed changes in dynamics of personal 
finances by relying on the self-report of respondents which might be biased. We 
find, however, that this is the only indicator, albeit limited, that can grasp economic 
dynamics among referendum’s voters. 
We measure the dynamic change in personal finances through the following 
variables (see Table 1 in Appendix 2): ∆personal fin.—same which compares the 
effect of stagnation to that of a positive change and ∆personal fin.—worse which 
compares the effect of worsening conditions as opposed to positive change. We also 
explore if this dynamic changes depending on education levels. 
Psycho-social effects of globalisation. We explore the effects of Quality of Life 
indicators (adapted from European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and 
Working Conditions (2012)) as well as emotions in Models 2.1 and 2.2. The first set 
of predictors concentrate on current evaluations of ‘life in general’: to what extent 
they would describe their life with emotions of anxiety and anger, whether life had 
got complicated, whether respondent feels being left out of society, and whether what 
                                                                                                                                          
of Education (GCE), an advanced certificate offered in the UK which leads to Level 
3 qualifications and permits to access Further and Higher Education. 
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respondent does in society has any worth. These are feelings of quality of life that 
permit to explore if Leavers feel to be left out in psycho-social terms. 
In Model 2.2 we explore whether the widely cited ‘left out effect’ has any foundation 
in worsening economic conditions. We therefore explore an interaction effect 
between psycho-social factors and evaluations of changes in personal finance. As 
before, we acknowledge that our analysis is limited through our reliance on self-
report. As this Model entirely relies on personal perceptions we do not find that self-
assessment of financial changes might be affected by specific feelings expressed by 
the voter. 
Income and social class self-identification. We treat Model 3 separately as an 
exploratory analysis of self-assessment of class and income categories. We take this 
data from the smaller, common set of respondents of the post-referendum study and 
the campaign wave study,. We explore respondent’s identification with the following 
social classes: working class, middle class, or none of the above (the latter is our 
baseline category). This helps us to clarify which classes, if any, Leavers identify 
with and allows us to critically analyse the interpretation of the referendum as ‘a vote 
of the working class’. We acknowledge the limitations of relying on self-assessment 
of class using the existing literature on class self-assessment. To complement our 
analysis in Model 1.2 we also analyse vote Leave in relation to reported income. 
This allows us to evaluate whether the results are consistent with the squeezed 
middle class argument that we propose. 
Findings 
The full results of our five models are presented in Table 1 in the Appendix 2. In this 
section we briefly report on the behaviour of our basic geographic, demographic as 
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well as political support predictors, and the sections below detail the specific effects 
we present as evidence of our hypotheses. 
 We detect significant age and gender effects, and confirm that voters of UK 
Independence Party (UKIP) were most likely to vote Leave (up to 46 times more 
likely than Conservatives, the baseline category) followed by Conservative voters, 
and non-voters (their odds being about 50-50). This pattern is broken only in our 
exploratory, small-sample analysis on income and social class identification, where 
age and gender effects vanish.3  
Education & lowering economic position 
In Model 1.1 (Figure 1) we focus on the effect of formal education. We detect 
significant effects associated with each education level.  
 
Figure 1 
Predicted probabilities by education (Model 1.1, left panel) and by perceived change 
in financial situation (Model 1.2, right panel). 
 
The link between education and voting Leave is negative in a general sense (β = 
0.89, t(0.19), p < .001), but not linear. Analysing the vote in relation to the different 
educational categories we predict the highest probability to vote Leave in the GSCE 
A*-C category, with a median of 79 per cent. We also find that the largest chunk of 
our A-level predictions (therefore people which decisively hold intermediate levels 
of education) still fall to the ‘leave’ side, suggesting that the link between increasing 
                                                 
3 We treat this as an artefact of a relatively complex model fitted on a small sample 
size, where small effects such as age in years are usually difficult to detect. 
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levels of education and voting Remain is mostly driven by the highest levels of 
education.  
Our findings confirm that there is a general negative relationship between education 
and voting Leave: in general terms, the higher the level of education, the lower the 
possibility of voting Leave. It rejects, however, the dichotomous view of the low-
educated Brexiter vs the high-educated Remainer (see Hobolt 2016a), by showing 
that two groups that can be considered with intermediate levels of education (voters 
with GSCE with high grades and A-levels) were more pro-Leave than the low-
educated (those with no formal education and with GSCE with low grades). 
In Model 1.2 we present the interaction between perceived change in personal 
finances and education, finding an ambiguous relationship. While worsening 
conditions increased the probability of voting Leave, the effect of stagnation is 
ambiguous. We present our predictions in Figure 1. The stagnation (’same’) group 
resembles most the average effect of education, which we consider as an artefact of 
the majority reporting no change. In our model respondents with A-levels slide 
towards a Leave vote as their economic conditions worsen. Our model also predicts 
that those with lower grade GSCEs would vote Leave only if their economic 
conditions had not changed. This effect found in respondents with A-level 
qualifications mirrors the interaction effect described by Goodwin and Heath 
(2016a). These authors showed that those with A-levels had similar profiles to the 
‘left behind’ group in terms of their support for Brexit if they came from low-skilled 
areas. Similarly, we find that those with A-level qualifications became more prone to 
leave as their personal finances worsened. Overall the position of those with A-levels 
seems to represent the profile of the squeezed middle as their probability of voting 
Leave changes depending on their structures of opportunities. 
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Despite the potential limitations of exploring personal finances by relying on 
individuals’ perceptions, overall this evidence shows that the Leave vote is not more 
popular among the low skilled, but it is more prevalent among individuals with 
intermediate levels of education. Furthermore, it is not widespread among those with 
a lower education who experienced declining financial positions. The relationship 
between education and personal finances is much more evident in the intermediate 
groups. 
Psycho-social effects 
Our results with regards to emotions and quality of life variables partly confirm the 
losers of globalisation hypothesis. 
Looking at the results of Model 2.1, we find no evidence that feeling left out of 
society is a predictor of voting leave. However, we find that other wellbeing 
indicators, such as not feeling what one’s doing in life is worthwhile (β = 0.89, 
t(0.19), p < .001), as well as feeling that one’s life has got complicated (β = 0.39, 
t(0.15), p < .05), are linked to voting Leave. We present the simulated probabilities 
in the left hand side panel of Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2 here 
Predicted probabilities by agreement with ‘I feel what I do in life is worthwhile’ 
(Model 2.1, left panel) and feeling left out of society by perceived change in 
financial situation (Model 2.2, right panel) 
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We did not find evidence that anger about one’s life is linked  to the referendum 
vote. In contrast, the effect of anxiety is significant and negative (β = −0.74, t(0.16), 
p < .001), suggesting that anxiety is typical of ‘remain voters’. We believe, however, 
that those feelings are directly connected to the outcome of the referendum, rather 
than being a substantive cause of their vote. 
Model 2.2 presents the interaction between perceived change in financial situation 
and the feeling of being left out of society. Interestingly, we find a correlation 
between feeling left out and voting Leave only amongst those who felt to have 
experienced worsening financial conditions (β = 0.83, t(0.34), p < .05) (see the right 
side of Figure 2). 
Overall these findings lead to two main results. First, our analysis rejects the image 
of the voter for Leave as the angry Brexiter or the one with specific feelings of 
anxiety. We can interpret the feeling of the Leave voter in terms of feeling his/her 
own life as not worthwhile, with the failure in managing her/his own life in the risk 
society (Beck 2006: 336) and as unelaborated feelings of frustration deriving from 
globalisation.  
Secondly, contrary to the interpretation of Brexit as reflecting a distinct outsider 
group, we found a more dynamic psycho-social explanation related to the perception 
of financial changes experience by Leavers. We found a relationship between voting 
Leave and the belief that life has got complicated. Further, the feeling of being left 
out of society was not sufficiently significant predictor of the vote to leave per se, but 
was only relevant in relation to a perception of worsening personal finances. This 
reinforces a different image of the Leave voter as an individual with a worsening 
social position, but not as perceiving that they are left out from society. This image 
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reflects the description of the impoverishment of intermediate class in the UK (see 
Parker 2013) and our argument of the Leave vote as the vote of the squeezed middle. 
Income and social class self-identification 
Regarding income in Model 3, our findings on class self-identification are contrary 
to the narrative that suggests that voting Leave is not associated with self-
identification as working class, but rather with those that self-identify as middle 
class, or having no class at all (β = 0.94, t(0.39), p < .05). Although there is an 
obvious limitation in interpreting self-assessment of class, this finding is relevant if 
we consider that, as recently reported by the Swales (2016b), most British people 
tend to identify themselves as working class - even if they have middle class jobs.  
Our interpretation does not deny that working class voters were part of the Leave 
vote. However, what we aim to show here is that, in contrast to what has been argued 
in public debates (and recently in academia by Winlow et al 2017), Leave is not the 
expression of a conscious working class vote. Further, it confirms that, as found by 
Swales (2016a), Brexit was not the voice of a unique segment of the society; rather 
was supported by a heterogeneous group including also the middle class. In addition 
we are able to confirm, as suggested by Dorling (2016), that the group that does not 
identify as ‘working-class’ is predominant in quantitative terms.  
We then analyse whether Brexit has been supported by an intermediate group in 
objective terms. In order to do this, we look at the probability of the Leave vote in 
terms of income, which enables us to overcome the misleading analytical division 
between working and middle classes in the UK class debate. Relying on the observed 
range of income, we split up the distribution into equally-sized groups and used these 
quantiles in our model. The result is partly similar to previous reports in that higher 
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income would link to the ‘remain’ vote. However, we are also able to point out that it 
is only the top quantile, the richest respondents, that slant significantly to the 
‘remain’ side (β = −1.94, t(0.49), p < .001). We do not find enough evidence to show 
that the effect of income is incremental: that the intermediate class, in income terms, 
would be more likely to vote ‘remain’ than the poorest groups.  
We show the predicted probabilities by income and class-identification in Figure 3. It 
is also apparent that our prediction intervals are wide, which further prompts us to 
interpret our small-sample results with caution. 
Figure 3 here 
Predicted probabilities by income quantiles and class identification (Model 3) 
 
Conclusion 
The Leave vote has presented a puzzle to social scientists: it is a vote that has 
reflected a widely felt socio-economic malaise, but it could not be interpreted as the 
voice of a socially homogenous social group. Our analysis of post-Brexit individual-
level data offers a new reading, which challenges the dominant narrative of the 
Brexiter as an angry and left behind individual. We believe that socio-economic 
effects were central in interpreting the Brexit vote, but we also find the socio-
economic malaise does not represent a group which has entirely lost out from 
globalisation, as opposed to one that has gained (Hobolt 2016a). The core group 
behind the vote is, according to us an intermediate group whose position is declining, 
a group which has been described as having high relevance for policy and politics 
(Parker, 2013; Hacker, 2011; Ranci, 2010). The reason for this decline of the middle 
could be found in overall processes of globalisation (Rodrik, 1998) or in more recent 
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dynamics of austerity affecting the Brexit voters (Bekker et al ,2016; Dorling, 2016). 
What we aimed to show here is that this segment of the population was more 
significant in driving the Leave vote than is assumed in the ‘traditionally left out’  
working class thesis.  
We make three main contributions to the literature. First, our model predicts that 
highest proportions of Leave vote is cast by segments with high GSCE grades and 
those with A-levels grades, rather than those with no qualifications or low grades at 
GSCE. We, therefore, found little evidence that those with a low education would be 
more likely to vote Leave than Remain as argued by Hobolt (2016a). We also find 
that some of the education effects were mediated by perception of worsening 
financial conditions amongst Leavers with A-levels (an intermediate level of 
education). This is not entirely a new finding (see Goodwin and Heath, 2016a), 
although scholars have previously overlooked these intermediate segments by 
referring to the negative correlation between education and Leave vote. We also 
confirm a negative relationship, but, by looking at different educational groups, we 
show that the link between increasing levels of education and voting Remain is 
mostly driven by those with top levels of education (given that intermediate voters 
were driving the Leave vote). 
Further analysing the Brexit vote, we wanted to understand the psycho-social profile 
of the Brexit voter, who has been described as being a society outsider and 
experiencing angry feelings. We did not find that such feelings characterised 
Brexiters, and neither did the feelings of anxiety described by Beck (1991). We 
found, that Leave voters had a specific negative feeling - the feeling of being 
worthless - that could be interpreted as a failure in managing risks of globalisation 
(Beck 2006). Our hypothesis of the Leave vote as the vote of the declining middle 
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was further confirmed by the fact that Brexiters felt that life has become more 
complicated. We also find that those experiencing feelings of having been left out 
from the society are more likely to vote Leave only when they feel to have 
experienced worsening financial condition in the last years. This points to the 
dynamics experienced by the squeezed middle rather than to the presence a 
crystallised left behind group. Future studies could explore which specific elements 
of globalisation drove these feelings (for example, migration flows, the activity of 
multi-national companies). 
A more extreme form of the ‘left behind’ argument, that has widely featured in 
public and political debates, suggests that Leave voters represent conscious working 
class voting. In our final exploratory model this hypothesis is rejected, as an 
association between identifying as middle-class and vote Leave was found – as well 
as no association with ‘working class’ self-identification. We also found that those in 
intermediate income groups were not more likely to vote for remain than those in 
low income groups. In this case, as in the case of education, those with top-income 
drive the negative correlation between income and voting for Remain. Individual-
level explanations have therefore clarified that the groups behind the Leave vote are 
not just those at the bottom of the social scale. 
Our attempt to operationalize the ‘squeezed middle’ in voting behaviour is, in many 
respects, exploratory and could be further expanded by including employment 
positions and salaries – crucial indicators that were not in our dataset. We intend to 
carry out further research on integrating the measurement of inequality with that of 
political behaviours to understand the role of the declining middle in forthcoming 
elections in Europe. Further, we acknowledge the limitation of the research design in 
that most of our predictor variables are measured after the vote has been cast and the 
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results determined, rather than prior to the referendum. It is possible that voters 
rationalise their responses given the referendum outcome. Nevertheless, we would 
argue that our relatively large sample in the post-election wave provides enough 
explanatory power.   
Overall, our argument of the squeezed middle behind Brexit is of a broad relevance 
for the discussion of how the new politics of inequality influences voting. It shows 
that the social malaise and the changes in the voting dynamics are not just led by the 
‘left behind’ (Goodwin and Heath 2016b), but rather include a significant segment of 
the population and require, therefore, public interventions that address inequality and 
not just social exclusion. 
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            Appendix 1 
Further details on methodology 
The following sections give further details on the methodology. For a full discussion, 
please consult our online appendix at www.voteadvice.org/squeezed-online.html 
Our primary data source is the opt-in panel implemented as post-referendum study. 
In total, 2,809 respondents, previous VAA users, have opted in taking the survey. In 
this, our primary aim was to gauge the voting population’s vote recall and search for 
possible explanations, through socio-demographics, political issue and party 
preferences, leader evaluations, as well as measures of psycho-social wellbeing.  
Consistent with research on the use of VAAs for academic research (Pianzola and 
Ladner 2011), we find that the over-sampled segments come from urban areas, men, 
the age category of late-twenties to mid-thirties, as well as the higher educated. 
Using this information, as well as vote intention amongst likely voters, we compute 
post-stratification weights so that the joint distribution of these variables mirrors that 
of the likely voter subsample of British Election Study pre-referendum wave. We use 
the package survey in R to perform this task. 
To evaluate the outcome, we build a ‘Null’, random effects logistic regression model 
where the dependent variable is probability to vote Leave, predicted by region only. 
This allows us to generate 11 Leave probabilities, for each region: 
Pr(yi = Leave|yi ∈ Leave,Remain) = logit−1(β0 + uregionj[i]) 
This random component is common in all subsequent models we build for 
hypothesis testing. We use the package lme4 (Bates et al 2015) in R to fit these 
models, accounting for the prior weights. We then exploit the ability of arm (Gelman 
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et al 2016) to generate (approximate) the posterior distribution of the outcome 
variable, to arrive at predicted probabilities. In all cases we use 95 per cent 
prediction intervals. At this stage, the importance of weights is crucial as predicted 
probabilities (percentage of people likely to vote Leave per chosen categories) would 
be unrealistic without the weighting component. 
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